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1. Introduction 
 
The East Asia region1 is the original source of the ideas, concepts and theories on the 
developmental state. These first began to emerge in the 1980s, based on historic 
overviews of initially Japan’s industrialisation from the late 19th century and then a 
wider collection of fast developing East Asian states from the 1960s onwards, most 
notably Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Into the 1990s and 2000s, studies 
focused on East Asia’s developmental statism remained largely preoccupied with 
evolving forms and patterns of state capacity, including some analyses contending that 
developmental statism was no longer relevant or had withered in the era of 
globalisation. Even most recent studies are still mainly concerned with traditional and 
‘conventionalised’ debates on the subject. 
 
This paper argues that to understand the relevance of developmental states in East 
Asia and elsewhere, we need to focus on the changing development agenda in the early 
21st century, especially how this connects with the global challenge of climate change 
and thereby sustainable, low carbon development.2 While progressively technological 
‘industrial development’ is still assumed to be the principal pathway that 
developmental states pursue to realise transformative economic and social objectives, 
this no longer exclusively concerns the core heavy industries of the late 20th century. 
Many of the growth industries of our current age are ‘green’ industries. Moreover, low 
carbon, sustainable development is the aspiration of not just ‘advanced’ high-income 
nations but also increasingly lower-income, fast developing economies and societies. 
Environmental welfare has become a growing socio-political priority, although raising 
levels of material prosperity and income remain dominant development goals. 
 
What we can thus observe, most clearly in East Asia, is the emergence of a ‘new 
developmentalism’, which can be defined as revitalised and refocused forms of state 
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capacity aimed at realising the transformative economic objectives associated with 
sustainable development. As is discussed, the analytical framework of this new 
developmentalism is a synthesis of state capacity theory (SCT) and ecological 
modernisation theory (EMT), the latter broadly entailing how to make capitalism 
environmentally sustainable by incremental change. Both political economic 
discourses have developed almost entirely independently of each other. However, over 
the last decade or so ecological modernisation has strengthened its influence over 
development policies worldwide, most notably in recent ‘green growth’ strategies. New 
developmentalism not only helps us understand current state capacity practice in a 
climate-challenged world but also how we have moved beyond original conceptions of 
developmental statism. This may be understood in the wider context of the sustainable 
development agenda and climate interventionism. As is argued, new 
developmentalism is most clearly evident in East Asia but is a concept that can be 
applied in a wider geographic sense where strong forms of developmental state 
capacity is exercised towards meeting transformative sustainable development goals. 
Two country case studies, on South Korea and Singapore, provide insights into key 
issues regarding East Asia’s new developmentalism. 
 
 
2. Developmental Statism and State Capacity in East Asia 
 
The profound economic transformation experienced by the East Asia region since the 
1950s has been both remarkable and incomparable. Accounting then for around 4 
percent of world gross domestic product (GDP), this share had risen to roughly 30 
percent by the early 21st century.3 Developmental statism – a term first coined by 
Johnson’s in his seminal historic work on Japan4 – has become a powerful explanation 
of how many East Asian states achieved their sustained, dynamic development based 
on a combination of factors centring on the directive roles played by the government.5  
This should not be confused with Western notions of state interventionism, where 
policy measures sought to manipulate markets and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
dominated nationalised industries. Developmental statism has crucial relational 
aspects, where governments form developmental partnerships or pacts with business 
and society to achieve transformative economic and social goals, traditionally 
improving income and material prosperity levels. It was founded on strong state 
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institutions with a capacity to develop and implement strategic policies to realise those 
goals, involving extensive co-ordination of resources among public and private sector 
agencies. Crucially, the East Asian developmental states were not socialist but 
capitalist economies, where powerful business sectors had over time been nurtured by 
the state. Economies that had effectively practiced the above may be considered ‘hard’ 
developmental states, such as Japan and the first generation ‘tiger economies’ of 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. However, certain features of developmental 
statism may be practiced less rigorously and effectively in other nations (e.g. Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines), and can hence be viewed as ‘soft’ 
developmental states.6 
 
Developmental statism is part of a broader state capacity paradigm that includes 
conventionally classified ‘socialist market’ states like China and Vietnam. Here, 
strategic economic planning agencies are also prevalent but where heavy state 
interventionism entails more direct control over markets and the means of production, 
hence with SOE dominance over key areas of the economy. 7  Socialist market 
economies nevertheless at times co-opt private enterprise to help meet strategic 
economic objectives, thus distinguishing them from pure socialist or communist 
economies. The state’s capacity to realise transformative economic change links both 
developmental states and socialist market economies. As a rule, the term ‘state 
capacity’ has been used as a generic explanation of governments proactively shaping 
the paths of an economy’s development.8 
 
The nature and practice of state capacity in East Asia has evolved significantly over 
time in light of changing economic, business, political and technological realities. For 
example, the transnationalising forces of globalisation has made the pursuit of state 
‘national industry’ development projects generally less relevant and tenable.9 Global 
firms such as Samsung and Sony no longer require state-assisted ‘nurturing’. The 
development agenda, challenges and priorities of East Asian states have too changed 
significantly. Whilst techno-industrial upgrading and raising levels of material 
prosperity remain key development objectives in the region, these have had to be 
increasingly reconciled with environmental sustainability goals. This is mainly due to 
East Asia’s rapid industrialisation making it an environmental victim of its own 
economic success. Acute air pollution in major cities and many other localised 
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environmental problems have had growing negative impacts on human welfare, 
creating domestic social and political pressures on East Asia’s governments to ‘green’ 
their development policies accordingly. This has combined with mounting 
international pressures on East Asian states to take stronger actions on climate change 
given the region is by far the largest emitter of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases (GHGs). Addressing the challenges of sustainable development has, though, 
presented more of an opportunity than threat to state capacity practice in East Asia. 
This is because it requires new methods of tackling market failure, reformulations of 
state-business-society relations, and new approaches on industrial policy, e.g. 
promoting green energy. Regarding environment-related market failure, this involves 
firmer state policies to simultaneously address both negative externalities (e.g. 
reducing the ‘social costs’ of pollution and other forms of eco-damage) and positive 
externalities (e.g. promoting the ‘social benefits’ of clean energy). 10  The two case 
studies on Singapore and South Korea presented later provides insights into this 
strengthening environmental dimension of developmental statism.  
 
 
3. Ecological Modernisation and Development 
 
Ecological modernisation has played an instrumental role in shaping environmental 
thinking on recent state capacity practice in East Asia. Originating from the ideas and 
theories of European scholars in the 1980s and 1990s11, ecological modernisation 
proposes how economic growth may be reconciled with sustainable development 
through gradual rather than revolutionary reform, and the adaption and improvement 
of existing economic, business and social structures to realise environmental 
objectives. EMT postulates that state, society and business all have roles to play in 
‘greening’ capitalism, mainly through supporting the drive forward of new eco-
industries and environmentally sustainable practices in production, distribution and 
new technology application.12 Firms could thus still continue to make profit, expand 
market share and meet other corporate objectives whilst acting ‘sustainably’. Financial 
markets need not be reinvented to fund sustainable development projects, rather 
adjusting themselves to exploit new ‘green business’ opportunities or incentivised to 
do so through government policy.13  Ecological modernisation thinkers also emphasise 
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the vital importance of policy interventions to address aforementioned environment-
related market failures to help realise sustainable development objectives.14  
 
After influencing European policy-making from the 1980s, the World Bank soon too 
began to apply EMT to its development policies, and its influence also grew within 
higher-income country policy-circles around this time, including Japan, South Korea 
and Singapore.15 By the mid-2000s, EMT’s influence had become increasingly evident 
across East Asia and other developing regions.16 In China, it became closely associated 
with President Hu Jintao’s ‘scientific development concept’ first proclaimed in 2004, 
thereafter becoming the official ideological basis for China’s future economic and 
social development when ratified into the national constitution in 2007. In the same 
year, the Chinese Academy of Sciences published the China Modernization Report 
2007: Study on Ecological Modernization, when the government also launched its 
Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy as well as its 
National Climate Change Strategy, where in both cases EMT thinking was strongly 
evident.17 Ecological modernisation’s emphasis on the state’s role in promoting green 
capitalism and environmentally sustainable industries primarily manifested in East 
Asia through new low carbon development, ‘green growth’ and sustainable energy 
strategies introduced across the region from the early 2000s onwards, as shown in 
Table 1. Before we examine some empirical detail on this in our two case studies, let 
us explore more specifically how ‘new developmentalism’ combines both state capacity 
and ecological modernisation theory and practice into a synthesised analytical 
framework. 
 
 
 
4. New Developmentalism as Concept and Theory 
 
4.1. Outlining New Developmentalism 
 
As Wylde explores in his own special issue paper18, the term ‘new developmentalism’ 
or ‘neo-developmentalism’ has been used elsewhere to explain new state-active 
policies (including industrial policies) in Brazil, Argentina and some other Latin 
American countries in a more-or-less conventional neo-Keynesian macroeconomic 
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sense, signifying a break from previous neo-liberal policies in this region and with no 
specified linkage made to low carbon development, environmental policies or climate 
interventionism.19 The ‘new developmentalism’ concept I deploy here is based on a 
distinctly different and broader theoretical approach and empirical foundation by 
combining two hitherto separate scholarly discourses – SCT and EMT. Both are 
principally concerned with transformative development and emphasise the critical 
role played by the state and institutions in shaping markets and paths of economic 
development, working in partnership with business and society. The core goals 
associated with each theory – progressive techno-industrial upgrading and sustainable 
development respectfully – have over time conflated. They are both also interested in 
how transformative development is governed, the former mainly with industrial 
policies, strategic plans, targets and outcomes, the latter in reflexive responses and 
tactical adaption to new changing environmental realities. To generalise, state capacity 
practice may be considered more planned and structured in approach whereas 
ecological modernisation is more incremental and evolutionary, yet these two 
approaches can be viewed as complementary. Developmental states have always had 
to adapt to changing domestic and international circumstances. As noted earlier, local 
(e.g. acute urban air pollution) and global (e.g. climate change) environmental 
imperatives have compelled development policy-makers to increasingly promote 
decarbonisation of their economies with gradually more ambitious plan targets.  
 
All states are under growing pressure to take action on climate change as the principal 
global challenge and existential threat currently facing all humanity. While this is not 
exclusively governments’ responsibility, global climate governance and diplomacy is 
primarily an inter-governmental process under the aegis of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The COP21 Paris Agreement 
signed in December 2015 is the latest UNFCCC treaty to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions through the ‘national determined contributions’ (NDCs) mechanism, where 
each signatory government is obliged to set decarbonisation targets and implement 
policies to meet them. Each country will take its own NDC actions but because fossil 
fuel combustion accounts for around 80 percent of world GHG levels, green energy 
and low carbon development will be necessary policy priorities. In those countries with 
strong state capacity, ‘climate interventionism’ will comprise increasingly ambitious 
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macro-plans on these fronts. Here, climate interventionism refers to state policy 
actions that address the various market failures to have caused climate change. 
 
As with developmental statism and state capacity practice generally, new 
developmentalism has relational aspects. Both SCT and EMT stress the importance of 
effective state-business partnerships to achieve transformative development goals. 
However, as the special issue paper from Jennifer Hsu explores, (civil) society has 
become a more proactive and empowered form of agency in the development process. 
Democratisation, the rise of non-government organisations, and the emergence of new 
civic institutions has created a more expansive set of development stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, as our country case studies reveal, a top-down authoritarian state 
approach to pushing through low carbon development strategies has often been a 
political and institutional feature of East Asia’s new developmentalism. At the same 
time, works from both EMT and SCT have highlighted the growing influential role 
played by civil society and social movements as developmental partners.20 As we later 
discuss, decarbonising economic activity involves, inter alia, various societal 
processes. Furthermore, ‘stronger society’ is able to feedback important intelligence 
and information on development issues and challenges, and make state authorities 
more accountable for good development policy and governance.  
 
To summarise, new developmentalism is an analytical synthesis of state capacity and 
ecological modernisation theories. It has become especially relevant in the last decade 
or so in East Asia, in the context of growing disenchantment with the contemporary 
neo-liberal orthodoxy as well as the exigencies of tackling climate change and other 
critical environmental pressures. New developmentalism can be defined as revitalised 
and refocused forms of state capacity aimed at realising the transformative economic 
objectives associated with sustainable development. In terms of its empirical and 
functional elements, it is concerned with the governance of developmental process, 
state policy and strategy-making, development targets and objectives setting, and 
state-business-society relational dynamics. East Asia’s new developmentalism is 
intended to synchronously promote sustainable and techno-industrial development 
within the same state policy and strategy context but as we discuss there exist some 
inherent tensions and contradictions regarding its underlying ideas, politico-
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institutional processes, and technical practices, as well as its reconciliation with other 
development policies.  
 
 
4.2 Further Outlining through Conceptual Differentiation 
 
Other authors have too focused on the incorporation of sustainable development goals 
into developmentalist governance and practice in certain East Asian states. Kim and 
Thurbon’s ‘developmental environmentalism’ centres on South Korea’s recent green 
growth strategies, these being broadly conceived as “the reimagining of the 
relationship between the economy and the environment”21 by the country’s policy-
making elite, who – as  Thurbon explores in a follow up work – continues to formulate 
national economic strategies generally with a ‘developmental mindset’.22 Similar to 
the new developmentalism outlined in this paper, Kim and Thurbon argue that 
developmental environmentalism entails the simultaneous pursuit of economic 
growth and environmental protection by “efforts to develop, commercialize, produce, 
and export green technologies, products, and processes.” 23  While ‘developmental 
environmentalism’ acknowledges the wider ideational and social dimensions to how 
South Korea’s policy-elites formulated green growth strategies, it does not explicitly 
reference the influence of ecological modernisation thinking on these and other policy-
elites in East Asia and elsewhere. 
 
South Korea is also an empirical focus (others being China and Singapore) of the 
‘authoritarian environmentalism’ concept, 24  which is closely related to, or almost 
synonymous with Beeson’s notion of ‘environmental authoritarianism’. 25  Both 
concepts fix on top-down, authoritarian state approaches to addressing environmental 
challenges where civil society stakeholders play very limited policy-influencing roles. 
According to Gilley, the former is a “public policy model that concentrates authority in 
a few executive agencies manned by capable and uncorrupt elites seeking to improve 
environmental outcomes”26, where in Han’s words: “non-participatory environmental 
governance, autonomous central governments, aided by exclusive groups of scientists 
and technocrats, dominate the policy process.”27 In the latter concept, Beeson applies 
a very similar analysis to China and Southeast Asia and comes to similar conclusions: 
compared to liberal democratic countries many authoritarian governed states are 
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proving more effective at realising low carbon development goals, the corollary of this 
being further legitimisation of continued authoritarianism and heavy ‘market 
correcting’ interventionism on tackling climate change and other environmental-
related issues.28 
 
In contrast with these twin concepts, new developmentalism firstly casts a wider 
empirical net and a more political economic approach to explain why and how both 
authoritarian and democratic countries in East Asia have engaged with low carbon 
development, where revitalised state capacity is the common denominator. Its 
incorporation of ecological modernisation thinking into a conceptual synthesis with 
state capacity theory also presents a new way of thinking about developmental 
strategies and partnerships on low carbon development, as outlined in the previous 
section. While new developmentalism acknowledges that authoritarian exercises of 
state capacity on low carbon development may persist in some countries, it contends 
that over the longer term we can expect civil society and ‘localised’ actors and agencies 
to become progressively more important stakeholder partners to the state on efforts 
to decarbonise the economy and society. This is primarily due to the fundamental 
nature of low carbon development itself and the socio-technical revolutions it is 
already beginning to create. This is perhaps most evident in the ‘energy democratising’ 
impact of small/community-scale renewables and smart energy micro-infrastructure 
technologies that has created relatively autonomous local ‘energy societies’ to form in 
many parts of the world. Such low carbon technologies combined with social 
entrepreneurship and community-level initiatives have enabled this process, in most 
cases with state policy support.29 Thus, ideal forms of new developmentalism allow for 
state capacity to be reflexive and responsive to the socio-technical and socio-cultural 
changes created by the longer-term deepening low carbon development and the 
impacts of its pervasive technologies on society. 
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5. New Developmentalism in Practice  
 
5.1 Initial Phases and Evidence 
 
States in developing regions began to implement modern sustainable development 
policies long before ecological modernisation ideas and theories became influential. 
Perhaps the deepest historical examples of this relate to what we would categorise 
today as ‘green energy’, although ironically these policies were not always at the time 
based on environmental motives. Hydropower dams were first used from the late 19th 
century and throughout the 20th century to help drive forward industrialisation in the 
developing world. Even in Japan, hydro-electricity was the country’s dominant power 
generation sector until the early 1960s.30 China meanwhile started to develop its own 
solar photovoltaic (PV) energy technology in the late 1950s as part of its fledgling space 
satellite programme.31 After the 1973/74 oil crisis, a number of East Asian and other 
developing country governments began to introduce new green energy policies but 
primarily for the energy supply security reasons of diversifying source options, 
especially indigenously. Furthermore, green energy and green industry sectors 
generally have long been perceived now as emerging strategic industries with high 
growth potential. For example, the global wind energy sector has been expanding at 
an annual rate of around 20 percent annually and solar energy at around 35 percent.32 
These are also dynamic industries from a technological perspective with high rates of 
innovation and R&D investment.  
 
The promotion of green industries is thus consistent with the aforementioned 
industrial policy practice and techno-industrial upgrading motives (i.e. market 
growth, high value-added employment, and new enterprise formation) of conventional 
developmental statism. Moreover, East Asian and other countries that possess strong 
state capacity on strategic industry policy have the apparatus to promote green 
industry development. In the meantime, environmental policies have been introduced 
over time in East Asia, the earliest being typically in response to human health related 
problems. Japan introduced emission control policies in the 1950s and 1960s to deal 
with a series of industrial pollution crises, and South Korea similarly in the 1970s. The 
bustling city-port of Singapore enacted its Clean Air Act in 1971. In 1983, the Chinese 
government confirmed environmental protection as a basic national policy aim.33 
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Low carbon development strategies and green energy policies across East Asia began 
to take firmer shape by the 1990s and early 2000s, when the influence of ecological 
modernisation began to more widely spread in the region34, but these were not yet 
coherent multi-sector strategies. At this time, sustainable development policy actions 
in many parts of the region were generally ad hoc and sector-specific (principally green 
energy), or embedded in broader development policy frameworks where both carbon-
intensive and decarbonising activities were often being simultaneously promoted.  
 
However, by the early 2000s, East Asian states began to construct ‘first-phase’ multi-
sector green energy strategies.35 South Korea (2001 Basic Plan for New and Renewable 
Energy Development), Malaysia (2001 Small Renewable Energy Programme – 
integrated into the 8th Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005) and Vietnam (2001 Renewable 
Energy Action Plan, part of the Master Plan of Power Development, 2001-2010) were 
the earliest protagonists, soon followed by the Philippines (Renewable Energy Policy 
Framework, 2003-2013), and Thailand (2004 Strategic Plan for Renewable Energy 
Development). This was an important precursor of wider low carbon development 
macro-plans introduced by the mid-2000s across the region, as well as national 
climate change strategies, signifying an early formulation of ‘green growth’ strategies 
in East Asia. 36  China’s 11th FYP (2006-2010) contained elements of new 
developmentalism, and as Table 1 illustrates there was a gradual spread of new 
developmentalist practice by the late 2000s, including a ‘second phase’ of more 
coherent, ambitious and substantive green energy strategies among a wider set of 
nations. A key catalyst for this development was the 2008/09 global financial crisis. 
 
 
5.2 The Global Financial Crisis and ‘Green Growth’ 
 
The 2008/09 global financial crisis was arguably the biggest shock to the world 
economy since the end of World War 2. This global-scale market failure caused 
ultimately by poor financial market regulation precipitated a comprehensive re-
evaluation of the neo-liberal economic model, globalisation, and economic governance 
generally. As part of international co-ordinated efforts to fix the global financial 
system, national governments around the world implemented various fiscal and 
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monetary stimulus counter-measures. Many countries decided to combine this with 
their climate action agenda and new upgraded EMT-inspired industrial strategies, and 
led to a step-change up on ‘green growth’ strategy-making in East Asia.37  
 
The stimulus package incorporated into South Korea’s new Green Growth Strategy 
(2009-2013) – the subject of our first country case study below – accounted for around 
four-fifths of the government’s total post-crisis stimulus measures, and 2 percent 
(US$87 billion) of national GDP. Meanwhile, China’s own US$219 billion package in 
response to the 2008/09 crisis were dedicated to low carbon development 
initiatives. 38  Vietnam announced its own Green Growth Strategy in 2011, and 
Cambodia’s its National Strategic Plan on Green Development a year later based on an 
earlier ‘road map’ formulation devised in 2010. Other East Asian states were more 
sector-specific. Taiwan’s Green Energy Industry Sunrise Plan and Malaysia’s Green 
Technology Strategy were both launched in 2009. As later discussed in our second case 
study, the Singapore government launched its own Sustainable Singapore Blueprint 
plan in 2009.  
 
As Table 1 indicates, though, many East Asian governments embedded their low 
carbon development strategies within their existing macro-plan frameworks, e.g. 
China, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia and Thailand. Most significantly, a core element of 
China’s 12th FYP (2011-2015) was the Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI) programme, 
drawing on RMB4 trillion (US$610 billion) of state-directed support to develop seven 
targeted sectors (environmental protection and energy efficiency, new energy, next-
generation information technology, biotechnology, high-tech manufacturing, clean 
energy vehicles, and new material science) with annual 20 percent sectoral growth 
targets set, and to collectively account for 8 percent of national GDP by 2015 and 15 
percent by 2020. Meanwhile, the prime aim of Japan’s New Growth Strategy (NGS) 
introduced in 2010 was the ‘creation of a low-carbon society’ (METI 2010). However, 
with a change of government and ruling party in the country, the original NGS was 
ditched in favour for another with the same name. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s own 
launched NGS (mark II) was not primarily low carbon development focused, rather 
preoccupied with conventional macro-economic stimulus measures. The following 
two case studies on South Korea and Singapore illustrate in some depth the evolution 
and mechanics of new developmentalism in practice, as well as some of its inherent 
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contradictions and tensions. Their combination of similar and contrasting features 
makes for a useful comparative analysis. Both are renowned ‘hard’ developmental 
states but with different forms of political governance. Both have relatively strong 
economies and high-income levels but one is a medium-sized nation the other a small 
city-state.  
 
 
5.3 Case Study: South Korea 
 
South Korea’s dynamic economic development over the last 50 years has been largely 
based on successful rapid industrialisation and techno-industrial upgrading strategies 
undertaken by the state and the country’s chaebol conglomerated firms in close 
developmental partnership for most of this period. This, combined with high rates of 
urbanisation and material prosperity, has made it one of East Asia’s most carbon-
intensive societies. An Environment Conservation Act was ratified in 1977 but 
ecological modernisation ideas only began to shape South Korea’s development 
strategy-making from the early 1990s under Kim Young-sam’s presidency. 39  His 
successor, Kim Dae-jung, established the Presidential Commission on Sustainable 
Development in 2000, this being followed by the creation of a National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development in 2005 under then President Roh Moo-hyun.40 The new 
policies arising from these new institutionalised arrangements were, though, largely 
limited to a series of market-based incentives and regulatory measures to compel firms 
to adopt more environmentally-friendly business practices.41 President Lee Myun-
bak’s Green Growth Strategy (GGS) was first time the country had formulated an eco-
oriented development strategy with an activist industrial policy dimension. 
 
Of notable political and institutional significance was how the GGS reconstructed 
many elements of the developmental state apparatus that had been previously 
dismantled under the two Kim presidencies during the 1990s and early 2000s. Both 
the first GGS under Lee Myun-bak and the second that followed under Park Geun-hye 
were similar in conception and design to the FYPs that had operated from 1962 to 
1993, with a structure of layered goals and targets over phase periods, prioritised 
techno-industrial sectors to develop, governance mechanisms, funding formulas and 
state support budgets. For Thurbon, this was further proof of the aforementioned 
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‘developmental mindset’ philosophy that persisted in South Korea’s policy-making 
elite.42  
 
The First GGS was conceived principally as a post-crisis response to revitalise the 
South Korean economy and create a new developmental path forward into the 21st 
century. Other motive factors were also relevant. The nation’s high fossil fuel import 
dependency had created growing energy supply security concerns, exacerbated by oil 
price increases in the years leading up to the global financial crisis: from US$30 per 
barrel in 2003 to over US$100 by 2007, and then spiking to almost US$150 in 2008. 
A 28 percent depreciation of the Korean Won against the US dollar between August 
and November 2008 compounded the problem.43 Thus, the GGS included long-term 
plans to boost renewable and nuclear energy capacities, both involving extremely little 
or no import requirements or notable susceptibilities to commodity price volatility. Oil 
is used mainly for energy transportation purposes, and there was also an ambitious 
strategy on developing South Korea’s electric vehicle (EV) sector, like solar, wind and 
other renewable energy technologies perceived as a fast emerging strategic industry. 
The government allocated US$1.8 billion to support EV and other low carbon vehicle 
development, Hyundai and its network of sub-contractor production firms being the 
state’s main developmental partner in this project. The above encapsulates how 
environmental sustainability, energy security and emerging strategic industry 
promotion are three key political economic motivations behind East Asia’s new 
developmentalism.44 
 
The GGS also presented a politico-institutional opportunity to Lee Myun-bak to 
concentrate economic policy-making authority around a small powerful elite-group 
over which he wielded considerable influence. The newly inaugurated president 
quickly established the National Future and Vision Office in February 2008 within his 
own presidential Blue House office, appointing close ally Kim Sang-hyup to lead it 
organisationally and intellectually. The Office was charged with identifying ‘strategic 
growth sectors’ to revitalise the economy, and after sounding out advice from 
prominent think tanks at home and abroad Kim Sang-hyup made the decision to make 
‘green growth’ the core around which new industrial and development policy ideas 
clustered.45 President Lee responded very positively to this proposal, soon thereafter 
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laying political, institutional and policy foundations for his administration’s Green 
Growth Strategy.  
 
The co-ordinating centre or pilot agency of the GGS was the Presidential Commission 
on Green Growth (PCGG), overseen by President Lee himself and its 50 members were 
mainly handpicked technocrats and economists with very few civil society 
representatives. 46  The Lee administration also conferred important policy-making 
and implementation authority to a new consolidated Ministry of Land, Transport and 
Maritime Affairs. Lee utilised this new formed super-ministry to centralise 
bureaucratic power and push through his flagship GGS scheme, the Four Major Rivers 
Restoration (FMRR) project. This absorbed over a third of the Strategy’s budget and 
the project’s involved heavy mass construction attracted much public and 
environmental group criticism.47 Democratisation from late 1980s onwards in South 
Korea had created political liberal conditions for environmental and other civil society 
groups to flourish, as well as public concerns over environmental degradation to enjoy 
greater political traction.48 However, the Lee administration’s resolve to complete the 
FMRR project to its target objectives reportedly ignored significant public opposition 
and took legal-bureaucratic procedural short-cuts.49  
 
The First GGS was structured around three strategic approaches: (1) measures for 
climate change and energy independence; (2) creation of new growth engines, mainly 
developing green high-tech industries and greening of industrial practices; (3) 
contribution to international community that included externalising South Korea’s 
green growth approach through diplomacy and best-practice sharing. While the 
Strategy achieved some notable low carbon development successes, such as the EV 
project and building the world’s largest energy smart grid on Jeju Island, according to 
evidence examined by Sonnenschein and Mundaca (2016) it had virtually no impact 
at the end of the 2009-2013 FYP period of reversing South Korea’s long-term trend of 
rising carbon emissions. Its renewable energy targets also lacked ambition compared 
to other East Asian countries’ new developmentalist plans.50 When Lee Myun-bak was 
succeeded by Park Geun-hye in 2013, her government replaced the PCGG with the new 
Prime-Ministerial Green Growth Committee in October that year. The Second GGS 
launched in 2014 by the Park Geun-hye government and also based on a FYP format 
(i.e. 2014-2018) ran concurrently with a policy strategy on ‘Creative Economy’, and 
16 
 
continued to pursue many of the first strategy’s initiatives in a revised framework.51 
Yet, as  more widely discussed in the conclusion, the future of the Second GGS is 
unclear after President Park’s impeachment in March 2017. 
 
 
5.4 Case Study: Singapore 
 
Since it gained independence in 1959, Singapore has been continually governed by the 
Peoples’ Action Party (PAP), which adopted a developmental statist approach to 
economic management from the onset. It has overseen the city-state’s transformation 
into one of East Asia’s most developed economies and highest income per-capita 
society through an effective multi-dimensional development strategy based on high 
value-added manufacturing, financial hub services, entrepot port trade, foreign direct 
investment, human capital and infrastructure investment, and high-tech research and 
development. In many respects, Singapore could be viewed as a pioneer of East Asia’s 
new developmentalism. Its government was among the region’s first to implement 
recognisable environmental policies (from the early 1970s) and assimilate ecological 
modernisation ideas on economic development.52 The government unveiled its first 
environmental master-strategy in 1992, the Singapore Green Plan (SGP), although this 
was essentially an economic growth model intended not to compromise the 
environment. 53  While this and its sequel SGP launched in 2002 included some 
ventures on preserving certain habitats, a defining feature of Singapore’s sustainability 
approach has been the creation of ‘urban garden’ areas rather than conserving natural 
wildernesses. The city-state’s motivation behind its socio-technical endeavours to 
‘green’ Singapore’s living spaces in ever more imaginative ways is driven by the 
imperatives of finding new ways of enhancing its citizens’ welfare and in turn also their 
satisfaction with ruling PAP governments. Like in other higher-income East Asian 
nations where certain material prosperity thresholds have been reached, 
environmental welfare has become an increasing societal priority in Singapore, and 
thus ever more important to maintaining the PAP’s political legitimacy.54 
 
Nevertheless, inherent tensions and contradictions exist between Singapore’s 
economic and industrial development plans and its environmental master-strategies. 
For example, in 1995 – just three years after the first SGP’s inauguration – the 
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government ordered that the seven naturally formed Jurong Islands just off the 
southwest coast be terraformed into a singular merged landmass as part of its 25-year 
petrochemical industry development plan. 55  Singapore eschewed setting carbon 
emission reduction targets around the time of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol mainly due 
to its plans to further develop this and other carbon-intensive sectors. This is a key 
feature of the East Asia new developmentalism story, where both carbon-intensive and 
decarbonising activities are promoted within concurrent development strategy 
contexts.  
 
As with South Korea under President Lee Myun-bak, decision-making authority in 
Singapore’s new developmentalism has been concentrated in a tight circle of state 
bureaucratic and political elites, whom under mono-regime political conditions have 
consistently pursued a strong anthropological approach to reconciling environmental 
and economic development goals.56 Institutionally speaking, development-oriented 
bureaucratic agencies have remained dominant partners in the formulation of the 
state’s sustainability plans. The original Singapore Sustainability Blueprint and its 
upgraded 2015 version was devised primarily by both the Ministry of National 
Development and the Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, with the 
Prime Minister’s Office also closely involved. This was Singapore’s most 
comprehensive environmental or eco-development masterplan to date, covering a 
wide range of policy areas (e.g. transport systems, waste management, resource 
efficiency, energy-efficient buildings and environmental standards) backed by a 
significant budget of S$1.5 billion. The SSB 2015 public document cites around 20 
other state agencies that were involved in the consultation and design process.57 No 
civil society organisations are listed. However, in its review of the original SSB the 
government claims to have considered general public feedback from more than 
130,000 people on specific projects (e.g. Land Transport Master Plan 2013 and Urban 
Redevelopment Authority’s Master Plan 2014), conducted a series of ‘focus-group’ 
dialogue sessions with a sample of the populace, and consulted 6,000 people in other 
dialogues and surveys on the SSB generally.58 
 
The Singapore government has increasingly sought public feedback in policy-making 
and implementation processes as a kind of societal intelligence-gathering mechanism. 
Nevertheless, the Singapore state continues to strictly regulate civil society groups, and 
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their input into development policy formation must still conform to ecological 
modernisation norms, consistent with past practices.59 For Han, the Singapore state’s 
top-down, non-participatory governance approach has notable parallels with South 
Korea’s authoritarian environmentalism. 60  In a similar vein, Wong argues that 
Singapore’s core policy elite have placed too much faith in the idea that “society can 
modernise itself out of its environmental crisis” by a series of technocratic and 
technological fixes, where environmental issues are “too narrowly defined by state and 
industrial interests”, and that civil society needs to be more actively engaged as a policy 
stakeholder to form more balanced and holistic sustainable development strategies.61  
 
In some contrast to most other forms of East Asian new developmentalism, the SSBs 
have paid relatively little attention to developing new green industry sectors, rather 
‘greening’ existing ones. The strategy did commit Singapore to expand the number of 
its ‘innovation business districts’ mainly to promote best corporate environmental 
practice and sought to scale up solar and bioenergy power generation through new 
schemes such as SolarNova. Yet there were again no references to altering the 
economy’s industrial structure, where energy-intensive sectors like petro-chemicals 
remain prominent. Singapore’s urban-focused new developmentalism can too be 
understood as part of the eco-city development trend that has become popular across 
East Asia and other developing country regions. Cities are where carbon-intensive 
activity is concentrated and thus have a key role to play in decarbonising economies 
and societies. 62  East Asia’s new developmentalist strategies all contain city and 
provincial-level actions to some degree, varying in accordance to national political 
structures. 
 
 
6. Conclusion: The Future of New Developmentalism 
 
This paper has explored how new developmentalism, by combining state capacity 
theory and ecological modernisation theory, presents a new understanding of 
developmental statism in the early 21st century, when environmental sustainability 
and climate action has become increasingly critical in both national and international 
development agenda settings. In this concluding section, we consider paths ahead for 
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new developmentalism, assessing the key conditions needed for its future success and 
critiquing areas of state capacity practice that could be improved.  
 
The first condition is that deeper societal participation and engagement will be 
required for new developmentalism to more effectively achieve sustainable, low 
carbon development. Both SCT and EMT have stressed the importance of the state co-
opting society into transformative development projects. Low carbon development is 
as much a societal process as an economic one, encompassing individual lifestyle and 
choice issues at the micro-level as well as macro-level industrial and infrastructural 
strategies. Civil society is a crucial stakeholder in terms of contributing ideas on 
strategy design and providing useful societal intelligence feedback on strategy 
impact.63 From East Asia’s experience we have seen how state planners have at least 
acknowledged the importance of establishing a low carbon society and engaging civil 
society stakeholders in new developmentalist strategy-making.  
 
Yet we have to get beyond the planning document rhetoric to analyse how well is the 
state drawing upon society as an intelligence resource and working in stakeholder 
partnership. We saw in the case of Singapore – where state capacity is extraordinarily 
strong – that the government sought public opinion concerning the Sustainable 
Singapore Blueprint’s design, implementation and outcome stages but was 
nevertheless criticised for being essentially elite-technocrat driven and top-down 
generally. South Korea’s recent political leaders – especially President Lee Myun-bak 
– have too generally adopted a top-down approach in pushing through their own 
sustainable development agendas. Authoritarian governance of low carbon 
development in East Asia may be a persistent feature of new developmentalism for 
some time yet. However, in the longer-term states we may expect states to work in 
closer partnership with civil societal stakeholders because such a partnership is key to 
realising the most effective and smarter forms of low carbon society.  
 
The second condition relates to addressing contradictions and inconsistencies often 
evident within new developmentalist plans themselves, and between those plans and 
other concurrent development policies. For example, the scaling up of green energy 
applications has not only been used to decarbonise developing countries but meet the 
growing energy and industrial demands of fast-growing economies, as articulated in 
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government green growth strategies. In South Korea, the First GGS co-existed with the 
then Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy’s parallel industrial strategy of upgrading 
various stalwart energy-intensive sectors such as shipbuilding and steel.64 Singapore’s 
aforementioned burgeoning petrochemical complex in Jurong Island remains central 
to the government’s core industrial policy.  
 
Thirdly, consolidation and continuity of strategy will prove crucial to new 
developmentalism’s future effective implementation. South Korea’s President Park 
Geun-hye continued with the Green Growth Strategy FYP framework of her 
predecessor but her impeachment in March 2017 leaves the future of the country’s new 
developmentalism unclear. We may expect on the other hand mono-regime 
authoritarian states to adhere to long-term new developmentalist strategies and 
thereby consolidate their gains. 65  Certainly, China has proved more successful for 
example at meeting its green energy sector targets than Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan.66 As long as ‘authoritarian environmentalism’ delivers results, especially in 
terms of key welfare measures like reduced air pollution, this form of new 
developmentalism may persist for a while yet, although as argued earlier we can expect 
over the longer-term more organic, bottom-up societal influence on shaping future 
paths of low carbon development.   
 
The fourth condition is that new developmentalism is nationally devised and 
implemented but will become increasingly part of a much larger international 
climate action project. Development strategies in East Asia are still being formulated 
more or less in the same technocratic fashion, most commonly in national year-plan 
frameworks (Table 1). These plans have always had an international dimension, such 
as export targets and attracting foreign investment, and today’s sustainable 
development strategies are essentially framed on national economies. However, the 
core goals of new developmentalism derive ultimately from the global agenda of 
decarbonising economic activity and international efforts to tackle climate change. 
The United Nations ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (SDGs) launched in 2015 
(superseding the previous Millennium Development Goals) are together with the 
UNFCCC Paris Agreement the most important latest attempts by international society 
to tackle climate change and steer humanity towards a more environmentally 
sustainable development path. New developmentalist plans and strategies reference 
21 
 
their contribution to such wider international endeavours on low carbon development. 
The further thickening of global environmental governance and climate action 
generally is likely to strengthen new developmentalism at the national level as states 
comply with their international commitments here, as previously mentioned 
regarding the ‘national determined contributions’ mechanism of the UNFCCC Paris 
Agreement. Another interesting development has been South Korea’s 
internationalisation of its national green growth strategy in which it has positioned 
itself as a green ‘middle power’ in global climate governance, seeking especially to 
shape the low carbon development agenda.67 For example, it successfully bid to host 
the new UN Green Climate Fund (GCF) that is tasked with raising US$100 billion 
annually to help fund sustainable development in low-income nations.68 . 
 
The fifth and final condition follows on from the previous one, and concerns the 
continued mounting pressures on low-income countries worldwide to adopt new 
developmentalism. Governments from these countries are under domestic pressure to 
devise macro-plans on boosting economic growth in order to deliver higher levels of 
material prosperity. At the same time, deteriorating environmental welfare at home 
together with growing international pressures on developing countries to take firmer 
action on climate change compel them to ‘green’ their development strategies. Both 
global development and environmental situations are predicted to get worse before 
they better. The combination of diverging income-gaps in the world economy and 
persistently rising GHG levels and other ecological problems only serves to strengthen 
the imperative to find new developmentalist solutions. As most global GHG emission 
growth is located in developing regions – especially Asia – their own national 
development policies and strategies have been an important focus of attention to the 
wider international community. Developing countries have been subject to ‘carbon-
offloading’ due to the gradual relocation of many energy-intensive industries from 
high-cost to low-cost economies for business competitiveness reasons. This fact 
notwithstanding, East Asia is not the only developing country region where ‘green 
growth’ strategies have been pursued and where the twin pressures on states to 
intervene on development and climate coincide. As has been argued throughout, 
strong state capacity working in close developmental partnership with business and 
society is required for effective action on both fronts. 
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